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Learning How 
 
‘[L]earning how resembles learning that: sometimes you can see the truth for 
yourself, but sometimes you need to phone a friend.’ (Hawley, 2010: 397) 
 
Introduction 
A perennial debate in education concerns whether the curriculum should be 
structured around the transmission of educational content or should focus on 
inculcating skills (the skills/content debate). Due to the importance of this debate, 
one topic in epistemology that receives particular attention in education is the 
relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. On the curricular ‘macro’ 
level, the question is often asked whether the curriculum should be weighted towards 
theoretical subjects such as history, mathematics, science and literature (content) or 
vocational subjects such as cookery, carpentry, engineering or accounting (skills). 
On the curricular ‘micro’ level, it is a question within many subjects what is more 
important to teach – disciplinary content (in history, for instance the causes of the 
First World War or the consequences of the French Revolution) or disciplinary skills 
(such as analysis of historical documents or historical writing in the subject history). 
Understanding what sets apart theoretical- and skills-driven approaches to both 
these questions naturally invites consideration of the knowing-that/knowing-how 
distinction (and of related concepts, such as expertise or skill).  
In his Concept of Mind (1949) Gilbert Ryle famously distinguished between knowing-
how and knowing-that. For Ryle, the first kind of knowledge is more basic than the 
second: knowing-how is not merely a form of knowing-that, rather, knowing-that 
requires an explanation in terms of knowing-how. For many years since Ryle, the 
distinction between the two forms of knowledge (if not Ryle’s anti-intellectualism 
regarding knowing-how) were widely accepted in analytic epistemology. However, 
recent epistemology has seen a flurry of new interest in knowledge-how. (Stanley 
and Williamson, 2001, Stanley, 2011, Bengson and Moffett, 2011) Today, debate in 
the area commonly divides between intellectualist accounts (such as that offered by 
Stanley and Williamson) and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how (such as 
that of Ryle or Winch, 2009).  
In this paper, I explore the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist debate regarding 
knowledge-how. I hold that, especially in its intellectualist framing, the debate is 
belief-centric and I explore how understanding of knowledge-how may be advanced 
by adopting an agent-centred – or virtue-based – approach. Specifically, I hold that 
the concept of learning must play a crucial role in any virtue-based approach to 
knowledge-how. In this paper, I sketch the contours of such an account and explain 
the implications for both the epistemology of knowledge-how and the philosophy of 
education. 
Anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how 
Ryle famously distinguished between knowing-how and knowing-that in his The 
Concept of Mind (1949) and in an earlier (1945) paper entitled ‘Knowing how and 
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knowing that’. Ryle’s purpose in drawing the distinction was to challenge a Cartesian 
view of the mind that he saw as overly ratiocinative. According tp Ryle, an 
‘intellectualist legend’ underpins the Cartesian view; this is that idea that in 
performing an intelligent action a person must be guided by a set of mental 
instructions for the performance of that action. If the intellectualist legend is right, 
Ryle holds, then any action or doing must be preceded by an act of thinking or, at 
any rate, working out how to perform that action. However, any such act of thinking 
will itself be a doing; thinking or working out how to do something is, after all, a 
mental act. As this act too would have to be preceded by another act of thinking or 
working out how to perform it, a vicious regress would ensue. For Ryle, the solution 
is to forget the idea that any intelligent action must be preceded by an act of thinking 
and deciding how that action should be done. Instead, Ryle holds, one should see 
knowing-how as ‘…a capacity for or a disposition to a set of behaviors…’ (Fantl, 
2008: 455). Rather than being able to think about action, knowing-how is being able 
to and inclined to behave in certain ways.  
In his rejection of Cartesian intellectualism, Ryle’s behaviourism is obvious and it is 
somewhat of a puzzle that in the field of education (where the stock of behaviourism 
has sunk so far) Ryle’s position and the regress argument that he offers in support 
remains current. Part of the explanation lies in the importance that many education 
scholars attach to the phenomenology of knowing how. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), 
for instance, describe the common experience of what it is to learn how to perform 
complicated physical activities. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s ‘novice to expert’ 
model, when it comes to learning any complicated physical activity (such as hitting a 
golf ball, dancing or turning pottery on a wheel) the novice’s performance is 
characterised by halting and uncertain action and rigid adherence to taught rules or 
plans and then gradually improves, until their action becomes ever more fluent. By 
contrast, the expert no longer relies on rules guidelines or maxims, but, instead, 
exhibits an intuitive grasp of situations based on deep tacit understanding. (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, 1986). Other famous accounts that lean heavily on the phenomenology 
of being an expert are those of, for instance, Michael Polanyi (1966) and Donald 
Schon (1983). 
Carr (1979; 1981) rejects Ryle’s reduction of knowledge-how to ability. He discusses 
the distinction between knowing how to do something and being able to do it. Carr 
points out that, in the realm of mental action, there is no difference between being 
able to and knowing how to. If a person is able to multiply large numbers in his head, 
then he knows how to do it as well. However, the same is not the case for practical 
action. It is conceivable that a person knows, say, how to play the Moonlight Sonata, 
without being physically able to do it. All kinds of exigencies can lead to a situation in 
which a person knows perfectly well how to do something without being able to do it 
– the gifted pianist may, say, be injured or grow ill; they may be separated from their 
piano and so forth. Ability is not necessary to knowledge-how. Neither is it sufficient.  
Take this example: 
Suppose a famous dancer was to perform before an audience, an item from 
his repertoire to which he has himself given the following title:  
A Performance of Improvisation No. 15  
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To the astonishment of a member of the audience who just happens to be an 
expert on communications, the movements of the dancer turn out to resemble 
an accurate (movement perfect) semaphore version of Gray’s ‘Elegy’, though 
the dancer is quite unaware of this fact. (Carr, 1979: 407) 
While the dancer in Carr’s example is clearly able to signal Gray’s Elegy in 
semaphore, he does not know how to signal Gray’s Elegy in semaphore.1 
Intellectualism about knowledge-how 
In recent years, the most significant contribution to the know-how debate has been 
Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) suggestion that knowing how is really a form of 
knowing that. Stanley and Williamson point out the variety of propositional 
knowledge constructions: 
S knows whether p 
S knows when p happened 
S knows what p is like 
S knows who killed p 
Etc. 
All of these are clearly capable of being treated in terms of knowing that. What is 
important about all of these is that they contain embedded questions of the sort ‘what 
does s know?’ (s knows whether p happened or when p happened and so-on). 
Stanley and Williamson think that the same move can be made for knowledge-how 
constructions. What one really knows when one knows how to do something is the 
answer to the question ‘how does one do that thing’ and finally, knowing how comes 
down to the following: 
S knows how to φ just in case there is a way w, such that S knows that w is a 
way to φ. (2001: 425) 
Rumfitt (2003) criticises the very premise of Stanley and Williamson’s argument – 
whether all know how contexts really contain a ‘how to question’. Rumfitt points out 
that the fact that a ‘how does one’ question always seems implicit in know how 
contexts may be a peculiarity of English. In French, for instance, it is possible to 
express knowledge-how in two different ways. Take the difference between 
Pierre sait comment traverser le fleuve en nageant 
Pierre knows how to swim across the river 
And 
                                                 
1 Snowdon (2004) makes the same set of points about the relation between knowledge-how and 
ability. 
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Pierre sait nager 
Pierre knows how to swim. 
The first construction appears like the one in English in that it uses ‘knows how to’ - 
savoir comment faire – while the second does not appear like the English – the 
sentence uses simply ‘know to’ - savoir faire – and not ‘know how to’, so doesn’t 
contain an implied how to question. 
For this reason (Rumfitt also discusses the case of Greek, Russian and Latin) 
Rumfitt thinks that there are two species of knowledge-how: savoir comment faire 
and savoir faire. Rumfitt suggests that knowledge-how of the savoir comment faire 
kind is propositional or intellectual – it comes down to having a belief. On the other 
hand, the savoir faire kind of knowledge-how is directed at action – it comes down to 
being able to do something. 
Rumfitt concedes half of the game to Stanley and Williamson. If one follows him, 
Stanley and Williamson may be right about the nature of savoir comment faire (if not 
about savoir faire). A more decisive line of criticism is this. The fact that someone 
knows that w is the way to do φ does not necessarily translate into them being able 
to do φ in such a way that we would ordinarily say that the know how to φ. Take this 
example. Imagine that David tells Roger, step-by-step, how to play a difficult riff on 
the guitar and that Roger commits these instructions to memory. Clearly, even if 
Roger had the instructions down pat, he would not yet know how to play this riff on 
the guitar himself.2 This is common cause even for Stanley and Williamson who 
admit that there is a difference between knowing that w is the way to  φ and being 
able to instantiate φ oneself. They hold that way w can be known in two ways – in a 
‘demonstrative’ and in a ‘practical’ mode of presentation. (Stanley and Williamson, 
2001: 429) Koethe (2002) holds that this distinction between knowing the proposition 
w and being able to instantiate w oneself imports the distinction between know-how 
and know-that straight back into the debate. It also lays Stanley and Williamson open 
to Ryle’s attack on the intellectualist legend. For if one knows how to φ only if one 
knows how to instantiate w oneself, does this not mean that one needs to know 
another way (call this way w*) in order to instantiate w oneself, and so-on? (Koethe: 
2002: 328) Without offering an account of what it is to instantiate w oneself, Stanley 
and Williamson cannot draw the important distinction between impotently knowing 
how one does something, but not being able to do it oneself, and the practical 
potency we really want to explain – of both knowing how one does something and 
being able to do it. 
Towards a virtue account of knowledge-how 
Let us return to the example of David and Roger’s guitar-playing. Carter and 
Pritchard (2015: 12) use this example to bring something in particular to light. What 
David knows – that he both knows how to play the riff and can play it – is more 
valuable than Roger’s mere ability (after David has told him) to say how the riff is 
played. Carter and Pritchard connects the discussion of knowledge-how with virtue 
epistemology. Carter and Pritchard (2014; 2015) hold that, rather than intellectualist 
                                                 
2 The example is from Carter and Pritchard (2015: 12). See below. 
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or anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how, know-how is best explained in 
virtue terms – as a particular kind of cognitive achievement.  
Most accounts of knowledge-that in virtue epistemology are what are called 
‘success’, ‘credit’ or ‘achievement’ accounts of knowledge. For Ernest Sosa, for 
instance, knowledge is apt or competent belief and for John Greco, knowledge is 
cognitive success that arises from ability. By appealing to notions like competence 
and success from ability, Sosa and Greco appeal to terms that we would readily 
associate with the world of doing (competence, success, ability) to explain theoretical 
knowledge; my suggestion in this paper is that one must – naturally – apply the 
same thinking to the explanation of knowledge-how. 
According to virtue epistemology, traditional epistemology’s focus on knowledge as a 
particular kind of cognitive content is misplaced. The main cognitive account of 
knowledge on the table is the Justified True Belief (or JTB) account of knowledge 
and, since the 1960’s most philosophy about the JTB account have been solutions or 
elaborations on the ‘Gettier problem’ – Edmund Gettier’s (1963) illustration that 
justification, truth and belief are not jointly sufficient for knowledge. Virtue 
epistemology offers by far the most intuitively plausible response to the Gettier 
problem. At heart, the Gettier problem is a problem of epistemic luck. It is possible to 
believe some truth and – due to some lucky coincidence – also to possess 
justification for what one believes without fully knowing that truth. Take the case of 
the unfortunate tennis fan who switches on their TV briefly on a Sunday afternoon in 
1978 and sees Björn Borg taking match point against Jimmy Connors. Quite 
reasonably, the fan comes to believe that Borg won Wimbledon in 1978; however it 
turns out that while what they thought was actually so (Borg did win Wimbledon in 
1978) what they were watching just then was not the live match, but a replay from 
the 1977 final in which Borg also beat Connors. The tennis fan would have a true 
belief and would have justification for it (that they saw the point), but they would not 
know that Borg beat Connors in 1978. They would have a true belief due to an 
accident and not due to cognitive achievement.3 Virtue accounts of knowledge solve 
the Gettier problem by stipulating, quite reasonably, that a person only knows 
something when they believe the truth due to good thinking on their part and not due 
to luck. Knowledge results when a person’s cognitive make-up (either their cognitive 
faculties or their acquired epistemic character – see below) leads to their believing 
the truth.4 
Do Gettier problems also affect knowledge-how and can virtue accounts provide the 
solution? Stanley and Williamson themselves sketch the following Gettier type case 
for knowledge-how. 
Bob wants to learn how to fly in a flight simulator. He is instructed by Henry. 
Unknown to Bob, Henry is a malicious imposter who has inserted a 
randomizing device in the simulator’s controls and intends to give all kinds of 
incorrect advice. Fortunately, by sheer chance the randomizing device causes 
exactly the same results in the simulator as would have occurred without it, 
                                                 
3 The example is adapted from Dancy (1985: 25). In Dancy’s example John McEnroe beat Connors 
two years in a row, but McEnroe only beat Connors once in the Wimbledon final. Borg, of course, beat 
him twice (in 1977 and 1978).  
4 See Pritchard (2005) for discussion. For the original statement of the position, see Sosa (1980). For 
an application to education, see MacAllister (2012). 
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and by incompetence Henry gives exactly the same advice as a proper 
instructor would have done. Bob passes the course with flying colors... But 
there is a good sense in which he does not know how to fly. 
Just as a virtue approach has available the resources to counter the Gettier problem 
for knowledge-that, so it also has available the resources to counter the Gettier 
problem for knowledge-how. In the example above, Bob’s justified true belief 
regarding how to fly (or even any flying skill he demonstrates in the simulator) is not 
due to his cognitive achievement – it is due to luck. Bob would only genuinely know 
how to fly if he achieved flying success due to either his own inherent ability (unlikely 
for a skill like flying) or if he learned it by practice (most likely under instruction from a 
competent instructor). Achievement rules out epistemic luck. 
In order to rule out the Gettier problem as it affects knowledge-how and in order to 
provide a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge-how, Carter and Pritchard provides 
the following definition of knowledge-how: 
If one successfully F’s because of one’s ability (vis-à-vis F), then one knows 
how to F. (2014: 182) 
Carter and Pritchard hold that this virtue-account is an alternative to both 
intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge. Their account sees 
knowledge-how not in terms of the properties of the action performed, but sees it in 
terms of the cognitive achievement of an agent. 
While I believe Carter and Pritchard are on the right track, the problem for their 
account lies in tying success at the action F to the ability of the agent. In this, their 
account is not all that different from Ryle’s account that also ties success to ability. In 
fact, in virtue epistemology, one may see the debate between intellectualism and 
anti-intellectualism play itself out in another question – how we should conceive of 
the cognitive character of the successful or creditable knower. Early virtue accounts 
of knowledge (like, for instance, that of Sosa, 1991 and Greco, 2000) identified 
knowledge with the true beliefs produced by the reliable working of our cognitive 
faculties (such as vision, hearing, memory, etc.) On this view, when one assesses 
whether a person’s believing the truth constitutes a cognitive achievement, one 
essentially evaluates whether their cognitive faculties are operating well. If a person 
believes the truth because their cognitive faculties are functioning reliably, they have 
achieved knowledge of that truth. However, according to responsibilist virtue 
epistemologists like, for instance, Montmarquet (1993) and Zagzebski (1996), this 
conception of achievement is too meagre. Responsibilists hold that we would do not 
ordinarily see it as a particularly noteworthy achievement if someone trusts their 
eyes or believes what they hear; these do not involve a cognitive effort that someone 
deserves particularly great credit for. For resonsibilists, what a person does deserve 
epistemic credit for is a cognitive achievement that results from anintellectual virtue, 
like, for instance, being inquisitive or being rigorous in investigation or being critically 
minded. These intellectual virtues are not natural faculties, but are learnedcharacter 
traits, the having of which one is truly evaluated positively for. Sharp vision is not 
something that one can be responsible for, but being intellectually acute is. The 
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central debate in virtue epistemology concerns whether cognitive achievements 
should be identified with reliabilist or responsibilist epistemic virtues.5 
Carter and Pritchard’s virtue account of knowledge-how is of the reliabilist variety. 
For them, knowledge-how is successful action that is produced through ability. 
Recall, however, Carr’s point regarding the distinction between knowledge-how and 
ability. Ability is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge-how. For this reason, 
Carter and Pritchard’s virtue-theoretic ability account of knowledge-how will no more 
pass muster than Ryle’s account. As David Carr puts the point, part of the reason 
why our language has a term like ‘knowing-how to do something’ is to distinguish 
knowing how to do something from being able to do it by brute strength (or some 
other kind of brute ability, like speed). Compare the following example. There is a 
way to turn a screw into wood (depending on the construction of the screw and the 
density of the wood, one either drills a pilot hole or not and then twists the screw in 
with the right kind of screw driver). Given enough strength, one can knock a screw 
into wood with a hammer; however, that is not the way to turn in a screw. Being able 
to force something in by brute strength is not the same as knowing how to do it. The 
same holds for many other things. One could (say) pack a parachute by forcing it 
into its bag, but, clearly, this is not knowing how to pack a parachute (crucially, the 
parachute won't come out right). A reliabilist virtue account of knowledge-how such 
as Carter and Pritchard’s is unable to draw this distinction, since it sees any success 
that is achieved by ability (such as being able to squeeze a parachute into its pack) 
as knowing how. Being able to distinguish knowing-how from ability in virtue terms 
requires, instead, a responsibilist account. I turn, next, to providing such an account. 
Knowing how and learning how 
In her book Intelligent Virtue (2011), Julia Annas offers an account of the moral 
virtues in terms of skilled or expert moral action. She points out that in Ancient 
Philosophy there is a rich seam of thought connecting what it is to be moral to skilled 
practical action. Thus Aristotle draws many analogies between virtuous action in the 
moral sphere and practical expertise or techne: the competent moral actor and 
especially the good citizen or politician is like an expert craftsman in the moral 
domain. That person has learned from good role-models or masters (just like the 
craftsman has), has practiced his skill (just like the craftsman) and must exhibit it in 
context (just like the craftsman). The only difference is that the craftsman (say the 
doctor or the shoemaker) practices in a craft context and the politician in a political 
context. (Annas's main aim is to understand virtue in terms of knowledge how. My 
purpose in this paper is of course exactly the opposite: to understand know how in 
terms of virtue! However, if virtue is like knowledge-how then knowledge-how is also 
like virtue… making Annas’s account of virtue in terms of knowledge-how highly 
germane to this project.) 
 
Annas begins by making a number of important distinctions. Firstly, knowing how to 
do something is different from a natural ability like, say, being able to lift a certain 
weight. This is by now a familiar point. Secondly, knowing how must be distinguished 
from mere knack - this is the distinction that we already find in Plato between techne 
and empeira. In the Gorgias Sorates contrasts ‘knack’ (or ‘habitude’) to ‘art’. The 
                                                 
5 For more on the debate between reliabilist and responsibilist accounts of epistemic virtue, see 
MacAllister (2012). My own defence of virtue responsibilism is contained in Kotzee (2011). 
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distinction between the two is that the one who has mastered an art as knowledge of 
the first principles of the art, while the one who has a mere ‘knack’ can only do, but 
does not have any understanding of how what they do works. Of cooking, Socrates 
says: 
 
I say it is not an art, but a habitude, since it has not account to give of the real 
nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. 
(Gorgias, 465a)6 
 
What are the important features of know how as distinguished from mere strength 
and from unintelligent knack? Annas stresses two things: (1) knowledge-how is 
learned and (2) to know how, the doer must aspire to do what they do well and to 
improve. Together, these two conditions contribute to a number of distinct points 
about the nature of knowing how. 
 
Firstly, what is it to learn how to? On the virtue conception of knowledge-how,  know-
how is learned by paying attention to the example set by a master. However, 
learning is more than just doing what the master does - learning how to is not just 
copying the master. For a person to learn how to φ successfully - for a person to 
come to know how to φ - it is important that they learn how to do φ independently or 
for themselves. The point of learning how is to move beyond mere repetition or 
copying (to move beyond knack). We see this through Annas's example of the 
impersonator. Imagine a pianist whose greatest accomplishment is impersonating 
another pianist. Imagine that the impresonator can play exactly like the great pianist, 
with all the same mannerisms and niceties of style. (Annas, 2011: 17). In one sense, 
of course, the person can play the piano pretty well, but if they can only play like the 
great pianist can we regard them as anything like an artist in their own right? Or take 
the painters who worked in the studios of the great masters. If they could only paint 
in the style of their master were they really painters in their own right as we would 
see it? Annas's point is that to know how to do something is to know how to do it for 
oneself or independently. Mere copying or routine action - even if successful - is not 
knowing how. 
 
Why is this so? There are two reasons. I call these the newness and the wholeness 
of situations. The first reason (the newness of situations) is that the master can only 
show the learner so many cases of the skill in action. The great pianist, presumably, 
has made only so many performances that the impersonator can copy. What if one 
placed the impersonator, or the one who merely copied his master, in a situation that 
he has never been before: say one demanded of the impressionist to play a piece 
that the great pianist never performed. They would, presumably, be stuck for 
knowing what to do. If the imitator could do nothing but copy - if they did not learn 
general modes of doing and gained independence at doing, they would not be able 
to act in unfamiliar situations. The second reason has to do with the wholeness of 
situations. In any situation there is a whole number of important facets that a person 
could respond to. If a person could only copy and only do exactly what a master did 
in a similar situation, how would they know which are the relevant features of the 
situation to respond to or how would they even know in what senses and what not 
the situation is the same? 
                                                 
6 Compare Stanley and Krakauer, 2013. 
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What Annas thinks the one who learns a skill learns is general principles of 
performing the activity in question. They need to learn not just what to do but why 
they need to do that kind of thing in that kind of situation. Being able to give 
principles and reasons for why one does something in a certain way is what moves 
the one who is merely copying to the plane of knowing how to do something. For 
Annas the one who knows how to φ not only can do φ successfully but can articulate 
reasons why one should φ in such and such a way. Knowledge-how is knack plus 
articulation. 
There is a well-known counter-example against this way of thinking. Dreyfus cites 
the case of the once very successful baseball player Chuck Knoblauch: 
As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was... voted 
best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than simply fielding a hit 
and throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and took up 
a ‘free, distanced orientation’ towards the ball and how he was throwing it 
– the the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he couldn’t recover his 
former absorption and often – though not always – threw the ball to first 
base erratically – once into the face of a spectator. (Dreyfus, 2007: 354) 
There is also a host of other examples like this. What about the brilliant scientist or 
mathematician who can't explain his own subject (perhaps to students or to the 
public). Or what about the converse - the person who is not such a great 
mathematician or scientist, but is a great teacher or populariser of the subject. What 
is, then, the link between knowing how and articulation? 
 
The examples are completely misleading. No-one demands that the expert be able 
to articulate what they are doing as they are doing it. This, in essence, is McDowell’s 
reply to Dreyfus. The point that overthinking baseball hits is bad does not reflect 
anything deep about the inarticulability of knowing how – rather, it simply reflects 
that, when one plays baseball, one should keep one’s mind on the ball and not think 
of other things. Moreover, no one demands that the relevant articulation always be in 
words; the only thing Annas demands is that one be able to give reasons why one 
acts like such and such. This form of giving reasons need not be entirely verbal, it 
can also work by demonstration. In practical contexts, a demonstration that is partly 
verbal and partly physical demonstration or action does the trick equally well: for 
instance ‘look, if I hit like this and not this, this will happen’.7 
 
The value of knowledge-how 
 
A last question remains and this is what is good about knowing how to do something 
as opposed to simply being able to do it. This is the question of the value of 
knowledge-how: why do we want a virtuous doer who really knows how to do 
something rather than just a successful one? Is understanding of principles of action 
not besides the point as long as one is assured of successful action?  
                                                 
7 Catherine Elgin has mentioned the following objection: that one can know how to speak English 
without being able to articulate all of the rules of English grammar. The same line of thinking, about 
demonstration, covers this case too. Anyone who knows how to speak English can demonstrate (for 
the most part) what it is to speak correct English and can point out incorrect English.  
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A useful answer takes us back to Plato. In a well-known passage from the Meno, 
Socrates asks what the difference is between knowing the truth and merely believing 
the truth. Socrates asks us to imagine that we want to travel to Larissa, but do not 
know the way. A blind man, who has never travelled the road to Larissa himself and 
must, we suppose, be repeating hearsay offers to tell us the way. Should we take it? 
The example is set up to illustrate the point that it is the truth (or not) of what the 
blind man says that matters to whether we reach Larissa or not; if the blind man tells 
us the right way to reach Larissa, we will get there, whether the blind man truly knew 
the route to Larissa or not. If we accept Socrates's account, knowledge – that is true 
belief that is also justified or rational – is no more valuable to practical success than 
true belief by itself. This gives rise to the ‘problem of the value of knowledge’: if true 
belief is as good in securing practical success as knowledge, what, then, is the value 
of knowledge over and above true belief? This problem is equally applicable to 
knowledge-that and to knowledge-how. Following this example, we can easily ask 
what is more valuable, that we understand (and can follow) the correct way w to get 
to Larissa… or that we truly know how to get to Larissa? The task for the virtue 
responsibilist is to explain what is more valuable about knowing how to get to 
Larissa. 
 
Let us look more closely at the Meno problem. As I hold elsewhere, the Meno 
problem is based on a misleading way of framing the basic kinds of epistemic 
problems we face in ordinary life. If I ask a person the way in real life, the problem is 
not to work out what is more useful – knowing the correct way or being able to tell 
the correct way. The problem is whether to trust someone to tell us the way or not. 
(Kotzee, 2013: 5 – 7) 
As Craig puts it: 
'It is not just that we are looking for an informant that will tell us the truth 
about P; we also have to be able to pick him out, distinguish him from 
others to whom we would be less well-advised to listen.' (Craig, 1990: 18)  
For Craig, the fundamental epistemic problem we encounter in real life is whether we 
should trust people to tell us things – whether we should believe what they say. 
Craig holds that our epistemic language and concepts – like ‘knowing’, ‘evidence’, 
‘justified’, ‘rational’ are all markers of how we deal with this fundamental epistemic 
problem of trust. They are concepts that help us designate people as good 
informants or not; in other words, describing so-and-so as ‘knowing’ something is not 
describing her as a person to be trusted.   
Craig writes mostly about what others say to one or tell one – he is interested in 
whether informants are trustworthy in communicating propositional knowledge. 
Notice, however, that the same as is the case for good informants must be the case 
for practical experts. The practical expert is the analogue, in the field of knowing 
how, to Craig’s informant in the field of knowledge-that. One basic problem we face 
in the practical realm is whether to do something in a particular way. The most basic 
question in practical action is this: if I want to achieve φ, should I do φ in way w or in 
some other way? Another important question is: should I attempt φ in way w 
myself… or should I perhaps let another person do φ on my behalf? In order to 
answer these two questions, we turn, in ordinary life, to practical experts. Experts 
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may do two things for us: Firstly experts can do things on our behalf that we cannot 
do ourselves. Take the case of the accountant who fills in our tax return for us or the 
lawyer who defends us in a court of law – they act on our behalf or for us – they do φ 
for us. Secondly, experts can tell us how to do something – they can tell us the way 
w to do φ if we either want to or need to do φ for ourselves. Perhaps, one cannot 
always afford what it costs to entice someone to φ on one’s behalf or perhaps one 
may be in a situation where there is no-one else to φ for one. In the latter case, it 
may require practice to become able to φ in way w for oneself, but, at least if one 
knows what way w is, one knows what to practice or how to practice it in order that 
one can begin to φ  for oneself. 
The value of the practical expertise of another person, then, lies in the fact that they 
can do for one or can tell one how it is done; as Hawley writes, when one needs 
something doing, it is often helpful to be able to phone a friend. (2010: 397) The 
trouble comes in the shape of having to identify which friend to phone. As we saw 
above, the realistic situation we find ourselves in is that we cannot directly tell 
whether someone is expert or not – we have to find some other way of gauging the 
goodness of the information one's informant offers. Furthermore, knowing that 
informants are fallible, we take a certain amount of risk in acting on what an expert 
tells us or letting them act for us. This is where procedures for telling whether 
someone is likely to be successful come in – it is the source of the demand that we 
make of experts that they are not only typically successful at what they do, but that 
they are responsible – that they have some form of justification for what they believe. 
Put simply, we demand that practical experts are not only able to act successfully or 
teach us successfully, but that they be able to articulate reasons why they or oneself 
should act like this or that in trying to achieve this or that. Annas explains that the 
difference between know how and mere lack lies in the ability of the one who knows 
how to articulate reasons for acting as they do. Elaborating on Craig’s approach, I 
have now also shown why being able to articulate these reasons is valuable and, 
consequently, why knowing how to do something is more valuable than simply being 
able to do it. Being able to give reasons why one should act in a certain way enables 
us to know when to trust someone to do something on our behalf or to trust their 
instructions regarding how to do something (in order that we may follow these 
instructions ourselves). 
Carter and Pritchard (2014) rightly see what David knows (in being able to say how 
to play the guitar and in being able to play it) is more valuable than what Roger 
knows (only being able to say, but not to do). Seeing this in the light of the problem 
of identifying practical experts yields a straightforward answer as to why what David 
knows is so valuable. If we want to hear a tune on a guitar, someone who can tell us 
how to play it is valuable and someone who can play it for us right now is valuable in 
a different way. However, someone who can both tell us how to play it and play it for 
us is most valuable of all.   
Learning from experts and for oneself 
Demonstrating practical expertise to another is the analogue, when it comes to 
knowledge-how, of ordinary testimony in the field of knowledge-that. As Hawley 
(2010) notes, testifying does not only mean telling. Telling is not the only form of 
testimony in the field of knowledge that. Neither is telling the only form of 
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demonstrating expertise in the field of knowledge how. Hawley describes a number 
of ways that someone can learn how to do something from one another. 
• A describes to B how to X 
• A gives B imperative instructions how to X (‘do this, do that’) 
• A describes to B how A does X 
• B overhears A talking to someone else about how to X 
• A intentionally shows B how to X, and B imitates A 
• A observes A X-ing and imitates A 
• B observes A trying and failing to X, and thereby works out how to X 
• Intentionally, or not, A forces or encourages B to come to know how to X 
(2010: 400) 
What is striking about learning how, is that it can happen through instruction or 
demonstration. Often it requires both. As Hawley holds: 
‘It’s very unlikely that there is a sharp line to be drawn between skills which 
can be transmitted through purely verbal methods, and those which require 
some practical demonstration: the vocabulary, resourcefulness and 
background knowledge of both speaker and listener will be relevant to 
determining what’s feasible in specific cases, as will the amount of time 
available.’ (Hawley, 2010: 401)  
This observation itself should already lay to rest many of the demons that plague 
educational thinking about knowledge how – whether it is theoretical or tacit. It is 
both and the trustworthy practical expert needs to be able to convince by word and 
deed that they are expert. 
Be that as it may, I can learn how to do something from you (and can do so in many 
ways next to being actively taught by you). Or I learn it for myself. There is no other 
way. An important point to notice is that it is does not make sense to speak of things 
one just knows how to do without having learned it. Even our most taken-for-granted 
tacit practical knowledge is learned – how to walk, swim, speak our mother 
language, etc. We do not say that we learned how to breathe, swallow, or let our 
heart beat, but, then, neither do we say that we know how to breathe, swallow or let 
our heart beat – these are just things that happen or that our bodies do. Admittedly, 
there are cases in which we say, for instance, that ‘someone had to learn to swallow 
all over again’ (say, after having had an accident or having been ill), but then, in 
cases like these, a person deserves a whole different kind of credit for learning how 
to swallow again compared to the rest of us who swallow naturally (and may, even, 
be said to know how to swallow again, after this effortful learning process). As David 
Carr has shown, the most fundamental distinction in this area is between being able 
to do something and knowing how to do it and if there were innate knowledge how, 
there would be no difference between knowledge-how and ability. Following Craig, I 
have held that the very point of the concept of ‘know-how’ is to pick out those who 
have more than just ability so that we can learn from them. These will also be people 
who have learned those same things – either from others yet, or for themselves. For 
these reasons, the concept learning, is central to the concept ‘know-how’. 
Conclusion 
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In this paper, I considered intellectualist and anti-intellectualists accounts of 
knowledge-how and defended a third possibility in thinking about knowing how – a 
virtue-based account of knowing how. A virtue-based account of knowing how  
demonstrates the advantage over other accounts of focussing on what really matters 
about knowledge-how – the fact that knowledge-how is more valuable than mere 
ability. However, in order to make sure that our virtue-account of knowledge-how 
truly does the trick, it is not enough to stress that there is a necessary causal 
connection between the ability of a person and their being able to do something 
successfully. It is also needed that that person has acquired a responsible or 
demonstratively trustworthy way of doing that kind of thing that they can either show 
or explain to others. This, I have held, can only come about if someone learned it. 
Based on work by Annas, I outlined such a responsibilist virtue-account of 
knowledge-how: knowing how to do something is a learned ability to act 
successfully, accompanied by the ability to give reasons for one’s actions. Because 
of the role that learning plays in this account of knowing how, it connects the 
concerns of philosophy of education and virtue epistemology once again.   
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